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The international community has begun to live up to its name.
Dramatic legal and political developments of the past fifty years have
greatly expanded the array of tools available for responding to grave human
rights situations internal to members of the community, and have
manifested an increased willingness to deploy those tools to further the
human rights values of the community. The results of these legal and
political developments were demonstrated in the international community's
response to the situation in Libya.
In mid-February 2011, in the wake of popular uprisings in Tunisia and
Egypt, members of the Libyan public began protesting against the decades-
old regime of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. The situation rapidly
escalated as the government sought to forcibly suppress the demonstrations.
By early March the situation had deteriorated into an armed conflict.2
A number of international organizations responded to the crisis in
Libya as it evolved. They utilized a variety of different tools, ranging from
official statements and press communiquds to the adoption of sanctions and
other legal measures. On March 19, 2011, a coalition of states initiated a
bombing campaign in Libya.? The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council
authorized this enforcement action in response to reports of serious
violations of international human rights law and the international law of
armed conflict committed in Libya by persons acting on behalf of the
Gaddafi regime.4
This article provides an overview of applicable rules of international
law through different phases of the situation in Libya and sketches out
various modes of enforcement action employed by international
organizations to respond to the crisis, analyzing several of the controversial
legal issues that arise in that context. The article concludes with an analysis
of the unresolved legal issues implicated by the evolving situation in Libya
and by the international community's responses to it.
1. Middle East and North Africa in turmoil, The Washington Post, July 13, 2011; Ian Black
& Owen Bowcott, Libya Protests: Massacres Reported as Gaddafi Imposes Nes Blackout, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 18, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18libya-protests-
massacres-reported (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
2. Libya crisis: Rebellion or civil war?, BBC NEWS, March 10, 201; McGreal, Chris et al.,
Allied Strikes Sweep Libya as West Intervenes in Conflict, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 19, 2011, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 1/mar/19/libya-air-strikes-gaddafi-france (last visited Mar. 18,
2011).
3. Id.
4. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). See also Jordana Horn, U.N.
Security Council Authorizes Military Strikes on Libya, THE JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 18, 2011, available
at http://www.jpost.com/VideoArticles/Video/Article.aspx?id=212699 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
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I. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Non-intervention
One of the founding principles of the international legal order, and a
corollary to the equally fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of
states, the principle of non-intervention requires all states to refrain from
interfering in the internal affairs of other states, or, in the words of the U.N.
Charter, in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"
of other states.s While the scope of this principle was traditionally
understood to preclude international regulation of the way in which a state
treated its own people, that understanding has evolved considerably since,
at the latest, the advent of the U.N. Charter system.
In light of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter and the
practice of Charter bodies, it is now generally accepted that serious human
rights abuses, even if committed purely internally (i.e. not involving aliens,
foreign territory, or any other material interests of other states), are no
longer regarded as internal matters shielded by the principle of non-
intervention. Most states are also parties to specific human rights treaties,
further internationalizing the issue of how they treat their own people, and
correspondingly diminishing the scope of the principle of non-intervention.
Nonetheless, mere political wrangling within a state, even if it involves the
failure to meet international expectations of good governance, remains a
purely internal matter so long as it does not entail violations of international
legal obligations.
B. The Use of Force/Jus ad Bellum
Another fundamental rule of international law is the prohibition on the
use of force. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that "[a]ll Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."6
The two established exceptions to this prohibition are valid exercises of the
right of self-defense and enforcement action taken in accordance with U.N.
Security Council authorization. These international rules on the use of
5. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
6. Id.
7. Id. art. 42 & 51.
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force apply only between states. Thus, the prohibition on the use of force
does not apply internally to a state.9
C. The Law of State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens
The Law of State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens regulates the way
states treat foreigners. It provides for a baseline of humane treatment,
essentially protecting foreigners against serious human rights abuses,
denials of justice, and other unjustified deprivations of liberty or property.
Embedded in the traditional state-centric international legal system, the
responsibility of the wrongdoing state, in general, may be invoked only by
the state of nationality of the victim.'o
D. The Law ofArmed Conflict/Jus in Bello/International Humanitarian
Law (IHL)
The international law of armed conflict regulates the conduct of
hostilities and provides legal protections for individuals not, or no longer,
taking part in the hostilities. As such, the vast majority of its provisions
apply only in times of armed conflict or occupation." Prior to World War
II the jus in bello, in general, applied only to interstate armed conflicts.12
Starting with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 it also began to regulate non-
international armed conflicts, including purely internal armed conflicts. 3
With the advent of international legal regulation of non-international armed
conflict came the direct applicability of IHL to non-state, organized, and
armed groups.14  While international law still provides more extensive
regulation of interstate armed conflicts than of non-interstate armed
conflicts, the extent of difference has diminished."
8. Id.
9. Id. The way in which force is employed within a state is regulated by other rules of
international law that have evolved in the post-World War II era, including international human rights
law and the law of non-international armed conflict.
10. See the International Law Commission's Articles on Diplomatic Protection, commended
to the attention of governments by the U.N. General Assembly in its resolution 65/27 of 6 December
2010.
11. See, e.g., art. 2 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907; common article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
12. See art.2 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.
13. See common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
14. J. Cerone, Much Ado About Non-State Actors: The Vanishing Relevance of State
Affiliation in International Criminal Law, 10 San Diego Int'l L.J. 335 (2009).
15. J. Cerone, Holding Military and Paramilitary Forces Accountable, Human Rights and
Conflict, US Institute of Peace (2006) at 226.
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E. International Criminal Law in the Strict Sense 6
International criminal law, in the strict sense, refers to those rules of
international law, the breach of which gives rise to individual criminal
responsibility in international law. These rules of international law directly
bind individuals, as opposed to operating through the vehicle of domestic
law (e.g. suppression treaties). The core crimes in international criminal
law are war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and aggression.17
As Libya is not a party to the Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), Libyan nationals committing acts entirely within Libya are bound
only by those international criminal prohibitions that have acquired the
status of customary international law. Most, but not all, of the crimes
prohibited by the ICC Statute were prohibited by customary international
law during the relevant period.'8
F. International Human Rights Law
International human rights law, in general,'9 regulates the way a state
treats individuals under its control by requiring states to respect and ensure
certain fundamental rights of the human person. As noted above, the
evolution of this relatively modern body of international law has greatly
reduced the scope of the non-intervention principle in relation to a state's
conduct toward its own people.
Unlike the areas of international law identified above, human rights
law is principally treaty-based. Libya has been a party to several universal
and regional human rights treaties since well before the 2011 unrest. Libya
is a party to, inter alia, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
16. International Criminal Law in the strict sense refers to rules of international law, the
breach of which gives rise to individual criminal responsibility. The qualifier "in the strict sense" is
used to distinguish this body of law from the rules of international law regulating interstate cooperation
in criminal justice matters generally, such as suppression conventions and extradition treaties. Certain
prohibitions, for example the prohibition of genocide, bind both the individual and the state, and also
give rise to suppression obligations.
17. Article 5, ICC Statute.
18. Genocide and most war crimes and crimes against humanity are prohibited by customary
international law. See generally ICTY, Tadic Appeal Decision, 2 October 1995, and subsequent ICTY
jurisprudence.
19. The scope of application of human rights treaties varies. Article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires states parties to "respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant. . . ."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter
ICCPRJ.
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Rights (ICCPR) 20 and its first optional protocol; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights;21 the Convention on the Rights of
the Child;22 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women;23 and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (ACHPR or "African Charter").24
The ICCPR is subject to derogtation. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR,
States' may take measures derogating from certain obligations under the
Covenant to the extent strictly necessary to respond to a "public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation." Among the derogable rights are the
rights to freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom from
arbitrary detention, and the right to a fair trial.25 States must officially
proclaim a state of emergency and must notify other States through the
intermediary of the U.N. Secretary General.26 According to available U.N.
records, at no time during the 2011 unrest did Libya lodge a notice of
derogation with the Secretary General.
20. Libya did not enter any substantive reservations upon acceding to the ICCPR. It did,
however, state that "[tihe acceptance and the accession to this Covenant by the Libyan Arab Republic
shall in no way signify a recognition of Israel or be conducive to entry by the Libyan Arab Republic into
such dealings with Israel as are regulated by the Covenant." Comment by Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to
the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, deposited with the U.N. Secretary-
General at n.22, ch. IV.3, in multilateral treaties (1976), available at
http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/libyat2 cescr.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
21. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
(Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cescr.pdf (last visited Mar. 12,
2012).
22. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (Sept. 2, 1980) available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/crc.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
23. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.Res.
A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.UN.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/
774/73/PDF/N9977473.pdfOpenElement (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
24. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58 (Oct. 21, 1986), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2012).
25. The Human Rights Committee has opined that certain of these rights may become non-
derogable when linked to a non-derogable right, such as the right to life. See U.N. Human Rights
Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of
Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.UNhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883fdlf.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter HRC
General Comment No. 29].
26. ICCPR, art. 4(3).
II. PHASES OF THE CONFLICT, AND MODES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT
A. Prior to the February Unrest
Prior to the unrest, the applicable law included all of the above bodies
of international law, except for the law of armed conflict and those rules of
international criminal law derived from the law of armed conflict. Libya
was fully bound by its obligations under all of the human rights treaties to
which it was a party and also by norms of customary human rights law.27
Similarly, Libya was bound by the requirements of the Law of State
Responsibility for Injury to Aliens in its relations with foreigners
(particularly those within its territory).2 8 Libya and individuals within
Libya were also under an obligation to refrain from committing the
international crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.29 Other
states, in their relations with Libya, were bound by the prohibition on the
use of force and the principle of non-intervention.o States were obliged to
refrain from interfering in the internal functioning of the Libyan political
system, at least to the extent that its functioning did not contravene Libya's
international obligations owed to those states.
B. February Unrest
By mid-February a series of protests broke out across Libya.32 Once
the unrest in Libya reached the point of a "public emergency which
threaten[ed] the life of the nation," Libya was permitted to derogate from
some of its obligations under the ICCPR to the extent "strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation."33  This would permit the Libyan
government a freer hand in arrest and detention matters, as well as in
27. Libya entered very few reservations when expressing consent to be bound by the human
rights treaties to which it is a party.
28. See generally, supra, notes 24-27.
29. See supra note 18.
30. U.N. Charter, art. 2.
31. In this context, it is important to recall the erga omnes nature of at least the most
fundamental obligations under international human rights law. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power
Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964 (July 24, 1964). See also the ILC's
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Intemationally Wrongful Acts, Int'l Law Comm'n, art. 48,
adopted in G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. AIRES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
32. Middle East and North Africa in Turmoil, WASHINGTON POST WORLD (updated July 13,
2011) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/specialworld/middle-east-protests/ (last
visited Mar. 12, 2012).
33. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 4.
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restricting the freedom of expression, the freedom of movement, and the
freedom of association. As noted above, Libya did not provide notice of
derogation to the treaty depositary.34 Nonetheless, there is some authority
to suggest that the failure to notify does not of itself preclude the lawfulness
of derogation.35 While in principle most of the rights in the ICCPR are
derogable, the burden would be on Libya to demonstrate the necessity for
each restriction imposed.
In any event, reports soon emerged of violations of even non-
derogable rights, such as the right to life and freedom from torture.37 The
gravity of the reported violations brought the matter beyond the internal
sphere, and gave standing to other states and international organizations to
invoke the international responsibility of Libya. Notwithstanding these
violations, at this stage, recognition of any entity other than the Gaddafi
regime as the government of Libya would likely still constitute a prohibited
intervention in the internal affairs of Libya. The use of force against Libya
remained prohibited. Notwithstanding the emerging notion of the
responsibility to protect, which may provide enhanced standing to take
diplomatic measures or economic sanctions, the use of force remains
precluded absent Security Council authorization.39  The use of force could
not be justified on the basis of collective self-defense since the protesters,
as non-state actors, have no international legal right of self-defense under
the jus ad bellum.
C. February 25
U.N. Human Rights Council Special Session: One of the first
organizations to adopt operative measures was the United Nations Human
34. See Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the United Nations.
35. See Consuelo Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia, Commc'n No. R.15/64, ICCPR, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 168, 110.3 (Mar. 24, 1982).
36. See generally HRC General Comment No. 29, supra note 39.
37. See e.g. UN. Investigator Opens Libya Torture Probe, CBCNEWS, Mar. 9,2011, available
at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/03/09/libya-torture-03091l.html (last visited March 12,
2011).
38. See Hum. Rts.Council Res. S-15/1, 14; see also Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, June 1, 2011, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/
17session/A.HRC.17.44_AUV.pdf(last visited May 14, 2012).
39. In 2005, the U.N. General Assembly affirmed the responsibility of states to protect their
populations from core international crimes, and asserted that the international commity shares in this
responsibility. The General Assembly declared its readiness to take collective action where states fail in
their responsibilities. See McCaffrey, Shelton, and Cerone, Public International Law: Cases,
Problems, and Texts, Lexis-Nexis (2010) at 1294.
[Vol. 18:2
Rights Council. On February 25, 2011, the Council convened a Special
Session on the "[s]ituation of human rights in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya."40 This was the 15th Special Session of the Council since its
creation in 2006. One of the advances of the Council over its predecessor,
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, is the relative ease of convening
Special Sessions. While the Commission required the support of a majority
of Members, the Council can convene a Special Session with the support of
only one-third of its Members.4'
Several others factors contributed to the convening of this Special
Session. Libya was at the time a member of the Human Rights Council.42
Furthermore, as noted above, Libya is a party to a number of international
human rights treaties. 43 There was, thus, a clear legal basis for invoking
Libya's international responsibility. In addition, the Ambassador of Libya
to the U.N. Human Rights Council had by this time ceased to support the
Gaddafi government and supported the convening of the Special Session."
In its Resolution S-15/1, of February 25, 2011, the Human Rights
Council decided to establish an international commission of inquiry and to
recommend that Libya be suspended from the Council.45
After recalling official statements on the situation made by other U.N.
bodies, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the
African Union, and the European Union, the Human Rights Council
strongly condemned the "gross and systematic" human rights violations
being committed in Libya, and suggested that some of the abuses might rise
to the level of crimes against humanity." It also "strongly call[ed] upon"
40. Report of the Human Rights Council on its Fifteenth Special Session, Doc. No. A/HRC/S-
15/1 (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/HRC-
S-15-l _AUV.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Report ofthe Human Rights Council].
41. G.A. Res. 60/251,1 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006).
42. See generally U.N. Human Rights Council, Membership of the Human Rights Council,
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncilImembership.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2011).
43. See generally, supra, notes 24-27.
44. "Human Rights Council passes resolution on Libya in Special Session-Delegation of
Libya addresses the Council, saying the will of the people is invincible," U.N. Human Rights Council
Press Meeting Summary, February 25, 2011.
45. Report of the Human Rights Council, supra note 42, at 3.
46. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, at I (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Resolution
1973]. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Approves "No-Fly Zone" over Libya,
Authorizing "All Necessary Measures" to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,
U.N. Press Release SC/10200, I 1 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.UN.orgfNews/Press/docs/2011/sclO200.doc.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter
U.N. Press Release]. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a crimes against
humanity is defined as one of a list of enumerated inhumane acts "committed as part of a widespread or
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the government of Libya to fulfill its responsibility to protect its population,
to comply with its human rights obligations, placing particular emphasis on
the freedoms of expression, assembly, and information,4 7 and to stop any
attacks against civilians.48
The Human Rights Council urged the Libyan government to "respect
the popular will, aspirations and demands of its people and to do their
utmost efforts to prevent further deterioration of the crisis."49 The Council
also stressed the need to hold accountable "those responsible for attacks in
Libya, including by forces under government control, on civilians."'o In
addition, it reminded Libya of its commitment, as a Member of the Council,
"to uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human
rights and to cooperate fully with the Council and its Special Procedures.""
The Council then decided to "urgently dispatch an independent,
international commission of inquiry . .. to investigate all alleged violations
of international human rights law in Libya, to establish the facts and
circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated, and, where
possible identify those responsible."5  Its express purpose was to ensure
"that those individuals responsible are held accountable."53
Finally, the Council recommended to its parent body, the U.N. General
Assembly, that Libya's "rights of membership" in the Council be
suspended, "in view of the gross and systematic violations of human rights
by the Libyan authorities."5
systematic attack directed against any civilian population," where the attack is "pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attackjol art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
47. As noted above, under the ICCPR the obligation to respect these rights is derogable. At
the same time, the Council points out that abuses are being committed against "peaceful" demonstrators.
See U.N. Press Release, supra note 71, at 6.
48. Id.
49. G.A. Res. S-15/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-15/1, 6 (Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Human
Rights Council Resolution].
50. Id. 7.
51. Id. T 9.
52. Id. I il.
53. Id.
54. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 74, 14 (referencing OP 8 of the General
Assembly resolution that created the Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 60/251, 8, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006)). This OP 8 provides that "the General Assembly, by a two-thirds
majority of the members present and voting, may suspend the rights of membership in the Council of a
member of the Council that commits gross and systematic violations of human rights."
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D. February 26
U.N. Security Council Emergency Meeting: On February 26, the day
after the Special Session of the Human Rights Council, the U.N. Security
Council convened an emergency meeting. The Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1970ss under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter and took binding measures under Article 41 of the Charter,
including the imposition of an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset
freeze.16 It also referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal
Court.s As with the Libyan ambassador to the Human Rights Council, the
Ambassador of Libya to the U.N. in New York had ceased to support the
Gaddafi government and spoke in support of the Security Council
resolution.ss
The preambular paragraphs of the Security Council resolution refer to
the "gross and systematic violations of human rights" taking place,59 as well
as serious violations of "international humanitarian law."60 The reference
to "international humanitarian law" may indicate a perception that the
situation in Libya had by this time evolved into an armed conflict.6'
Mirroring language employed by the Human Rights Council, the Security
Council also recalled "the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its
population," evoking the "responsibility to protect" concept, and perhaps
implying further consequences for continued failure to fulfill that
responsibility. 62
The Security Council welcomed the work of the Human Rights
Council and reiterated its call for accountability, emphasizing the
55. See generally S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter
Resolution 1970].
56. Id.
57. As Libya is not a state party to the ICC Statute and has not otherwise consented to ICC
jurisdiction, the Security Council referral was necessary to satisfy the legal preconditions to the exercise
of the Court's jurisdiction over the situation in Libya.
58. Swaine, Jon, Libya's UN. Ambassador Denounces Gaddafi, THE TELEGRAPH U.K., Feb.
25, 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libyal
8349048/Libyas-UN-ambassador-denoUNces-Gaddafi.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
59. Resolution 1970, supra note 57, at 1.
60. Id.
61. International humanitarian law is the international law of armed conflict. However, it is
possible that "international humanitarian law" is being used in a broader sense. This phrase is
sometimes used to include the prohibitions of genocide and crimes against humanity, both of which may
be committed in peace time (or in situations otherwise not reaching the threshold of armed conflict).
62. Resolution 1970, supra note 57, at 2.
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responsibility of superiors. It then recalled the Security Council's own
power to defer ICC prosecutions, perhaps telegraphing an incentive to
cooperate. 4 Article 16 of the ICC Statute provides that the Security
Council may defer an ICC prosecution for up to 12 months, with the
possibility of renewal.
The resolution's operative language begins with the Council's demand
for an immediate end to the violence and its call for steps to fulfill the
"legitimate demands" of the population.6 6 It urges the Libyan authorities to
comply with international human rights and humanitarian law, to ensure
the safety of foreign nationals, to ensure the safe passage of humanitarian
supplies and workers, and to immediately lift restrictions on all forms of
media.
The Security Council's referral of the situation to the ICC marks the
first time that the referral power has been used with the unanimous support
of Council members. The only other Security Council referral to date, that
of the situation in Darfur, was not unanimously supported. Both China and
the United States had abstained in that vote.69 China had also been a hold
out for the Libya resolution, but was ultimately persuaded to vote in favor
of the resolution.70 The Chinese delegation indicated that it supported the
resolution "taking into account the special circumstances in Libya."71
The ICC referral is followed by a jurisdictional exclusion similar to
that included in the Darfur referral. It provides that nationals, current or
former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id. at 2. Security Council deferral of an ICC prosecution could be stopped by the veto of
any permanent member. A continuing deferral would require the continued support of all five
permanent members.
65. Id.
66. U.N. Press Release, supra note 71, 1.
67. The reference to both international human rights law and international humanitarian law
may indicate the Security Council's position that these two bodies of law apply simultaneously to
situations of internal armed conflict. But see supra, note 61.
68. See generally U.N. Press Release, supra note 71.
69. See voting record for S/RES/1593 (2005), available at http://UNbisnet.UN.org:8080/
ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1D3670EJ33535.64569&profile=voting&uri=link=3100028-! 165528-!310002
9-!3100070&aspect=alpha&menu=search&ri=1&source=-!horizon&term=S%2FRES%2Fl593%2820
05%29&index=Z791AZ (last visited May 14, 2012).
70. Resolution 1973, supra note 48.
71. See generally Press Release, U.N. Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security
Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of
Crackdown on Protesters (Feb. 26, 2011), available at http://www.UN.org/News/Press/docs/
201 1/sc10187.doc.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
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Jamahiriya, which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State
for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless
such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State.n
By its terms this provision would seem to exclude not only ICC
jurisdiction, but any jurisdiction other than that of the non-state party.
Some delegations expressed reservations about this provision.
The Resolution also provides that the ICC's expenses in this matter
shall be borne by the ICC States and those states that wish to contribute
voluntarily. 74 The Resolution also creates a new Sanctions Committee to,
inter alia, monitor implementation of the sanctions, designate individuals
subject to the measures, consider requests for exemptions, and report back
to the Council.7 s
E. March 1
U.N. General Assembly suspends Libya's rights of membership in the
Human Rights Council: Acting on the recommendation of the Human
Rights Council, the U.N. General Assembly on March 1, 2011, in
Resolution 65/265, suspended Libya's "rights of membership" in the
Human Rights Council.7 6 This was the first time the General Assembly had
used its authority to do so.
F. March 3
ICC Prosecutor opens investigation: On March 3, 2011, the ICC
Prosecutor announced his decision to open an investigation into alleged
crimes against humanity committed in Libya since February 15." In his
72. In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime,
Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protestors-Situation Referred to International
Criminal Court: Security-General Expresses Hope Message 'Heard and Heeded' in Libya, U.N.
Security Council (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.UN.org/News/Press/docs/201 1/scl0187.doc.htm.
73. "In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime,
Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters," U.N. DPI, February 26, 2011,
SC/10187; see also "Chief Prosecutor of International Criminal Court Tells Security Council He Will
Seek Arrest Warrants Soon against Three Individuals in First Libya Case," U.N. DPI, May 4, 2011,
SC/10241.
74. Resolution 1970, supra note 57.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally International Criminal Court, Statement of the Prosecutor on the Opening of
the Investigation into the Situation in Libya (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.icc-
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March 3 Statement, he also identified certain individuals with "formal or de
facto authority, who commanded and had control over the forces that
allegedly committed the crimes," and thus "put them on notice" that they
could be held criminally responsible if forces under their command commit
crimes. In particular, he singled out Muammar Gaddafi, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Head of Regime Security and Military Intelligence, the
Head of Gaddafi's Personal Security, and the Head of the Libyan External
Security Organization.79  He also indicated that members of opposition
groups would also be subject to investigation if they commit crimes.so
He concludes by stating, "It is important to avoid an armed conflict in
Libya."" One could read this statement to mean that the ICC prosecutor's
position at that time was that the situation in Libya had not yet reached the
necessary levels of violence, organization, and duration to constitute an
armed conflict.82  There is no mention of war crimes in the March 3
Statement."
G. Early March
The emergence of armed conflict: By early March, at the latest, at
least some of the forces opposing the Gaddafi regime had constituted
themselves as organized, armed groups. In addition, the violence between
the government and these groups became sufficiently protracted and intense
to constitute armed conflict, leading to the application of the law of non-
international armed conflict.8 4  The application of the jus in bello also
brings about the application of the relevant war crimes provisions of
international criminal law.
H. March 12
Arab League calls for the use of force: At its meeting in Cairo on
March 12, 2011, the Council of the Arab League issued a statement on the
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/035C3801-5C8D-4ABC-876B-
C7D946B51F22/283045/StatementLibya_03032011.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter
Statement of the Prosecutor].
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id.
80. See generally Statement of the Prosecutor, supra note 106.
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id.
83. See generally Statement of the Prosecutor, supra note 106.
84. ICTY, Tadic Appeal Decision, 2 October 1995, paragraph 70.
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implications of the events in Libya and the Arab position.85 Most
significantly, the Arab League called upon the U.N. Security Council to
impose a no-fly zone and to create "safe areas."86  The Members of the
Security Council had already been discussing the possibility of the use of
armed force. In this context, the political support of the Arab League was
seen as a key factor.8 8
In the preamble of the outcome document, the League called for
compliance with international law and an end to the fighting. It also
called on the Libyan authorities to withdraw from the areas they "entered
forcibly" and to ensure "the right of the Libyan people to fulfill their
demands and build their own future and institutions in a democratic
framework."90
The Council then recalled its commitment "to reject all forms of
foreign intervention in Libya," but emphasized "that the failure to take
necessary actions to end this crisis will lead to foreign intervention in
internal Libyan affairs."9' It then decided to call upon the Security Council
"to take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on
Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to
shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan
people and foreign nationals residing in Libya....
I. March 17
Security Council authorizes the use of force: On March 17, 2011, the
U.N. Security Council, again using its enforcement power under Chapter
85. Arab League, Res. No. 7360, The Outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States
Meeting at the Ministerial Level on the Implications of the Current Events in Libya and the Arab
Position (Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%
20Ministerial%201evel%20statementA20l2%20march%202011*%20-%20english.pdf (last visited Mar.
7, 2012) [hereinafter Arab League Resolution].
86. Id.
87. Libya Revolt: The West's Options, BBC NEWS. March 9, 2011.
88. Christopher Blanchard, Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service
(Mar. 29,2011), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159788.pdf.
89. Arab League Resolution, supra note 116.
90. Arab League Resolution, supra note 116, T 6.
91. Id.
92. The Outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States Meeting at the Ministerial Level
in its Extraordinary Session on the Implications of the Current Events in Libya and the Arab Position
(Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%2OMinisterial%
201evel%20statement%201 2%20march%202011 %20-%20english%281%29.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2012).
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VII of the U.N. Charter, responded to the call by imposing a no-fly zone
and authorizing the use of armed force to protect civilians and "civilian
populated areas under threat of attack."9 3 Resolution 1973 also expanded
the existing sanctions and established a panel of experts to assist the
Sanctions Committee."
The resolution was adopted with a vote of ten in favor and five
abstentions.95 The abstentions came from the BRIC countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China) and Germany.96 The two permanent members
that abstained-Russia and China-have traditionally espoused robust
interpretations of the non-intervention principle. The abstaining
delegations cited a lack of information, the failure to exhaust diplomatic
means, ambiguity as to how force would be used and by whom, and doubts
as to whether the use of force would effectively achieve the Council's
purposes.
The operative text of the resolution begins with the Council's demand
for the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a "complete end to
violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians."99 The Council
also demanded that Libya comply with its obligations under international
human rights law, humanitarian law, and refugee law, and to "take all
measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs," as well as to
ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.' 00
In operative paragraph 4, the Council authorized the use of armed
force to protect civilians and civilian populated areas, while excluding
military occupation. Specifically, it authorized Member States that have
notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional
organizations or arrangements-and acting in cooperation with the
Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab
93. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
94. Resolution 1973, supra note 48.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. This attitude is further reflected in the votes of China and Russia during the subsequent
Special Session of the Human Rights Council ("HRC") on Syria. Both of these HRC Members voted
against the Resolution adopted at that Special Session. In October 2011, they vetoed a draft Security
Council resolution that would have contemplated measures being taken against Syria if it continued its
heavy-handed response to protest movements.
98. See generally S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
99. Id. 1.
100. Id. 3.
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Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force
of any form on any part of Libyan territory.10'
This broad grant of authority was narrowed by the requirements of
"acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General," the limitation to
protection of "civilians"'0 2 and areas "under threat of attack," and the
exclusion of occupation.'o3
The resolution also established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace "in
order to protect civilians," providing exemptions for humanitarian flights
and authorizing Member States to use armed force to enforce it.'0
In addition to strengthening enforcement of the arms embargo, the
resolution also expanded the asset freeze. 05  Mindful that a new Libyan
government will need these assets, the Council "[a]ffirm[ed] its
determination to ensure that assets frozen . .. shall, at a later stage, as soon
as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."' 06
Finally, the Security Council used its power to bind states to deprive
the Libyan government, and those acting on its behalf, of legal remedies
that might otherwise be available for breach of contract under domestic
law. 07  Operative paragraph 27 requires "all States" 08 to take "the
necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the
Libyan authorities . .. in connection with any contract or other transaction
where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the
Security Council . . ."9o
J. March 19
Coalition airstrikes begin: On March 19, armed forces of France, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and others initiated military strikes in
101. Id. 4.
102. Again, there is some ambiguity in the use of the term "civilian" and "civilian populated
area." Would this, for example, include civilians who directly participate in the hostilities? To what
extent would individuals cease to become "civilians" for this purpose if they had a continuous combat
function?
103. This exclusion of military occupation, however, would not preclude the use of ground
troops. It would preclude their establishment of authority over territory.
104. Resolution 1973, supra note 48.
105. Id.
106. Resolution 1973, supra note 71, 20. This issue has become acute as states have become
divided over whether to recognize the rebel authorities as the legitimate government of Libya.
107. Resolution 1973, supra note 48.
108. Note that this provision is not limited to U.N. Member States.
109. Resolution 1973, supra note 48.
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Libya pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973.n0 The intervention of
other states' armed forces brought into application the law of international
armed conflict."'
On March 27, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO would
undertake enforcement action in Libya.112  Control of the enforcement
action in Libya was subsequently transferred to NATO under unified
command." 3
K. March 25
African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights orders provisional
measures: On March 25, 2011, the African Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights unanimously ordered provisional measures against Libya.1 4  The
proceedings were instituted by the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, which lodged an application with the Court after receiving
a number of complaints alleging violations of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights by Libya, a state party." 5
The Commission did not request the Court to order provisional
measures.116 Nonetheless, the Court recalled that it is "empowered to order
provisional measures proprio motu 'in cases of extreme gravity and
urgency and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons' and
'which it deems necessary to adopt in the interest of the parties or of
justice."' 7
After satisfying itself, prima facie, that it had jurisdiction, the Court
reviewed statements and resolutions of relevant international
organizations." 8 In light of the condemnations of abuses contained therein,
110. Crisis in Libya: U.S. Bombs Qaddafi's Airfields, World Watch (Mar. 19, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20044969-503543.html.
111. While some have suggested that the jus in bello does not apply to U.N.-authorized uses of
armed force, this would contravene the basic principle that application of the jus in bello is independent
of thejus adbellum and does not reflect the majority position.
112. Letter Dated 29 March 2011 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Security Council (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%202011 %20203.pdf.
113. Id.
114. See generally In the Matter of Afr. Comm'n on Hum. and Peoples' Rts. v. Great Socialist
Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, App. No. 004/2011, Order for Provisional Measures (Afr. Ct. H.R.
Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter African Commission].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.10.
118. See generally African Commission, supra note 145.
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the Court concluded that "there is therefore a situation of extreme gravity
and urgency, as well as a risk of irreparable harm to persons who are the
subject of the application, in particular, in relation to the rights to life and to
physical integrity of persons as guaranteed in the [African] Charter."' 19
The Court then found that the circumstances required it to order, "as a
matter of great urgency and without any proceedings," 20 the following
provisional measures: 1) that Libya refrain from "any action that would
result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons, which
could be a breach of the provisions of the Charter or of other international
human rights instruments to which it is a party;" and 2) that Libya report to
the Court within fifteen days on measures taken to implement the Order. 121
The first provisional measure ordered is somewhat unclear. Use of the
term "could" introduces a degree of ambiguity. Further, it is unclear
whether the dependent clause beginning with "which" describes or qualifies
the preceding clause. It is likely that it qualifies the preceding clause, so
that only those actions that constitute a breach (or "could" constitute a
breach) of human rights law are encompassed by the Order.122
L. Mid-April
Concern at NATO interpretation of mandate: By mid-April, some
states, including Security Council permanent members Russia and
China, began to claim that the multinational force was exceeding the scope
of its mandate.123 In particular, they recalled that regime change was not
authorized by Security Council Resolution 1973.124
M May 4
ICC Prosecutor presents report to the Security Council: Pursuant to
operative paragraph 7 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970, the ICC
Prosecutor on May 4 reported to the Security Council on actions taken
119. African Commission, supra note 145, 122.
120. Id. 123.
121. Id.125.
122. Id.
123. Stephen Flanagan, Libya Managing a Fragile Coalition, Center for Strategic &
International Studies (Mar. 24, 2011), available at http://csis.org/publication/libya-managing-fragile-
coalition. See also Fighting words between European allies overshadow Libyan mission" CNN, March
22, 2011.
124. Id.
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pursuant to the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC.'25  In his
Report, the Prosecutor provided an overview of the preliminary
examination of jurisdictional issues conducted by his office, the ongoing
investigation, and anticipated judicial activities.'26
The Prosecutor found that available information provided "reasonable
grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed and
continue being committed in Libya," and he noted that there is also
"relevant information concerning" war crimes "once the situation
developed into an armed conflict." 27
As to admissibility, the Prosecutor indicated that his office had "not
found any genuine national investigation or prosecution of the persons or
conduct that would form the subject matter of the cases it will
investigate."l 28 He also found that the situation "clearly meets the threshold
of gravity required by the ICC Statute, taking into account all relevant
criteria."l29 He noted that there were no countervailing "reasons to believe
that the investigation would not serve the interests of justice," and thus
opened an investigation on March 3.130
In describing the ongoing investigation, he stated that his office was
pursuing those who bore the greatest responsibility.' 3' He also referred to
cooperation activities and reported receiving "outstanding support from
States Parties and non-States Parties alike." 32
After enumerating the type and quantity of evidence collected, he
indicated that this evidence revealed two main types of "incidents": 1)
"[s]ecurity forces allegedly attacking unarmed civilians constituting crimes
against humanity," and 2) "[t]he existence of an armed conflict with alleged
war crimes as well as other crimes against humanity that appear to have
been committed by different parties." 3 3 He then surveyed specific factual
allegations supporting the existence of these types of crimes, including
125. See generally International Criminal Court, First Report of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court to the U.N. Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011) (May 4,
2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A77E5F8-29B6-4A78-9EAB-
Al79Al05738E/O/UNSCLibyaReportEngO4O520ll .pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (hereinafter Report
of the Prosecutor].
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2-3.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. See generally Report ofthe Prosecutor, supra note 157.
131. See generally id.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 5-6.
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excessive use of force by security forces; "systematic arrests, torture,
killings, deportations, enforced disappearances and destruction of
mosques"; rape; and "unlawful arrest, mistreatment and killings of sub-
Saharan Africans perceived to be mercenaries." 3 4
As to the anticipated judicial proceedings, the Prosecutor indicated that
his office would soon be submitting its first application for an arrest
warrant.135 On May 16, the ICC Prosecutor requested a Pre-Trial Chamber
to issue arrest warrants for three individuals, including Muammar
Gaddafi.3 6
N. June 1
Commission of Inquiry issues report: On June 1, 2011, the
Commission of Inquiry, established pursuant to Human Rights Council
Resolution S-15/1 issued its report.137  The Commission opined that "a
significant number of international human rights law violations have
occurred, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity." 3 8
According to the Commission, the large majority of violations were
committed by those acting on behalf of the Gaddafi regime "in the pursuit
of a systematic and widespread policy of repression against opponents to
his regime and his leadership." 39 In addition, the Report noted that "[t]here
have also been violations by opponents to the regime." 4 0
As to methodology, the Commission "opted for a cautious approach in
the present report by consistently referring to the information obtained as
being distinguishable from evidence that could be used in criminal
134. Id. at 6. The Report also refers to abuses committed against "prisoners of war." To the
extent this refers to Libyan detainees, or nationals of states not parties to the armed conflict in Libya, in
the hands of the then Libyan government or rebels, the term "prisoners of war" is presumably used in a
non-technical sense (e.g., as a way to refer to detained individuals who had been engaged in the
hostilities), as this status does not exist in non-international armed conflict.
135. See generally Report of the Prosecutor, supra note 157.
136. Statement ICC Prosecutor Press Conference on Libya 16 May 2011, International
Criminal Court (May 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%/20the%20court/
office%20of/o2Othe%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/statement/statement%/o20icc%20prose
cutor/o20press%20conference%20on%201ibya%2016%20may/o202011 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
137. See generally Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry to Investigate all Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/44 (June 1, 2011), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/1 7session/A.HRC. 17.44_AUV.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter
Report ofthe International Commission].
138. Id. at 8.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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proceedings, whether national or international."'41 Despite its findings of
numerous violations of human rights, humanitarian, and international
criminal law, the "commission feels that, at this stage, it is not in a position
to identify those responsible, as requested by the Human Rights Council in
the resolution establishing its mandate." 42
0. June 27
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issues arrest warrants: On June 27, ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants for three senior Libyan officials,
including Muammar Gaddafi.143 This is the second time that the ICC has
issued an arrest warrant for a sitting Head of State. The first was for Omar
Al Bashir, the President of Sudan.'" As with the situation in Sudan, Libya
is not a State Party to the ICC Statute.
III. UNRESOLVED LEGAL ISSUES
The international community employed a broad range of tools in
responding to the situation in Libya-arms embargos, economic sanctions,
recognition/de-recognition, suspension of rights of membership, regional
human rights mechanisms, a commission of inquiry, an ICC referral, and,
ultimately, the use of force.145  The unprecedented combination of these
tools and the intersections of the various bodies of international law
identified above have given rise to a number of unresolved legal issues.
A. Derogation Under the ICCPR
The Human Rights Council and the Security Council both condemned
Libya for violations of provisions of human rights law and humanitarian
law.14 6  Among the rights invoked by both bodies were the rights to
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, both of which are subject
to limitation and derogation.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Report of the International Commission, supra note 169, at 8.
143. ICC Issues Arrest Warrants Against Muammar Gaddaf, Safi Al-Islam Gaddaf, and
Abdullah Al-Senussi: ICC and Coalition Press Statements, Coalition for the International Criminal
Court (June 27, 2011), http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=4640 (last visited Mar. 18,
2012) [hereinafter ICC Issues Warrants].
144. Id.
145. The Crisis in Libya, International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, available at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
146. Report of the Human Rights Council, supra note 42.
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As noted above, States a part of the ICCPR may take measures
derogating from some of their obligations in the event of a "public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation."1 47  While no clear
threshold has been established for determining when this standard has been
met, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee indicates that the
possibility of derogation arises only in situations of the utmost gravity. 14 8
In any event, this standard was clearly met by the time the situation in
Libya erupted into armed conflict.
In this context, two derogation related issues arise. The first is the
significance of Libya's failure to notify the other States a part of the ICCPR
via the U.N. Secretary General of any derogation. The second is whether
Libya's legal ability to derogate is impeded by the Libyan government's
role in creating the emergency situation.
As noted above, the failure to notify the Secretary General does not
necessarily preclude the lawfulness of derogation.149  The notification
nonetheless serves important purposes. It serves as an important procedural
safeguard by putting other States on notice of the derogation, presenting
them with an opportunity to assess the situation. More significantly, it also
requires the State derogating from its obligations to specify "the provisions
from which it has derogated and . . . the reasons by which it was
actuated.""
Apart from its failure to notify the Secretary General, Libya also failed
to provide any public statement concerning derogation. There was, thus, no
indication that Libya intended to avail itself of the capacity to derogate.
Nor was there any indication of what measures would be taken in
derogation of its obligations, the degree of derogation, or the extent to
which such measures were necessary. More recent jurisprudence of the
Human Rights Committee supports the view that the complete failure to
provide this information in any form may be fatal to the lawfulness of such
measures.1s51
The second derogation related issue is whether and to what extent a
state's participation in creating a situation of public emergency might
undercut its ability to derogate. There are at least two conceptual models
147. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 4, 1.
148. Hum. Rts. Com. General Comment 29, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 11, August 31, 2011.
149. See Consuelo Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia, Commc'n No. R.15/64, ICCPR, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 168, 10.3 (Mar. 24, 1982).
150. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 4, 3.
151. See Adrien Mundyo Buyso, Thomas Osthudi Wongodi, Ren6 Sibu Matubuka et al. v.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Commc'n No. 933/2000, ICCPR, U.N. Doc. No.
CCPR/C/78/D/933/2000 (A/58/40 vol. II) at 224,15.2 (July 31, 2003).
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for thinking about this issue. The first is by analogy to the relationship
between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
It is a basic principle of the jus in bello that its application is
independent of the jus ad bellum. The issue of which state violated the jus
ad bellum in bringing about a situation of armed conflict is generally
irrelevant to the application of the jus in bello.5 2 Once an international
armed conflict has begun, the law of armed conflict applies equally to all
parties, regulating the conduct of hostilities and providing protections for
individuals not, or no longer, taking part in the hostilities.'"s Nonetheless, a
state that violates the jus ad bellum would still bear international
responsibility for that violation, and would be obliged to make reparation
for all of its harmful consequences.15 4
Applying this model to the issue of derogation, one could argue that
the cause of an emergency situation should not affect the ability to derogate
once that situation has arisen. Thus, once the threshold of "public
emergency[,] which threatens the life of the nation[,]" has been met and the
state has announced measures derogating from its obligations in conformity
with Article 4, the applicable legal framework has been altered." Under
this approach, international law would not look "behind" the then
prevailing facts on the ground. The issue of who caused the state of
emergency would be irrelevant to the issue of derogation. At the same
time, the State would still bear responsibility for any human rights
violations, including those in violation of derogable obligations, committed
in the lead-up to the emergency situation.'1 6
Another approach would be to. proceed from the principle of "unclean
hands." This equitable principle, whereby actors are precluded from
benefitting from their own wrongdoing, is arguably a general principle of
law within the meaning of Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. 157 Variations of it are reflected in several fields of
international law, including the law of state responsibility and the law of
treaties. Under this approach, a State Party should not be able to avail itself
of the possibility of derogation if the government of that State Party created
152. McCaffrey, Shelton, and Cerone, Public International Law: Cases, Problems, and Texts,
Lexis-Nexis (2010) at 1457.
153. Id.
154. ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International
Law Comrn'n, art. 31, adopted in G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
155. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 4, 1 1.
156. ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International
Law Corrn'n, art. 1, adopted in G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
157. Statute of the International Court of Justice, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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the emergency situation by committing serious violations of human rights
law (e.g. in the context of a brutal crackdown against protesters). 58
There are strong arguments in favor of both approaches. The
advantage of employing the former approach is that it avoids having to
determine who was at fault in bringing about the new state of affairs. The
importance of this principle in the context of the jus ad bellum-jus in bello
dichotomy is particularly clear. States generally claim that their uses of
force are lawful, and there is no standing judicial body with jurisdiction to
determine otherwise. One could argue that the wisdom of remaining
agnostic as to which party wrongfully caused a conflict would apply a
fortiori in an internal context.
Moreover, states have agreed that irrespective of who started the
armed conflict, certain rules must be followed by all parties in order to
mitigate some of its effects.'59  This raises, however, an important
distinction with respect to the issue of derogation. In international law, the
principle of the independence of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello ensures
that the restrictions of the jus in bello will apply to any armed conflict.
Derogation is, in a sense, the inverse. The consequence of a valid
derogation is the removal of restrictions that would otherwise apply to the
conduct of the state party. Another basis of distinction may be found in the
nature and function of international human rights law. This body of law
principally regulates the way a state treats its own people, formerly
regarded as a purely internal matter. International human rights treaties
also establish compliance bodies to monitor implementation of the
obligations under those treaties, including in times of public emergency.Iso
B. Application ofInternational Human Rights Law during Armed Conflict
The issue of whether and to what extent international human rights law
applies in situations of international armed conflict and occupation remains
controversial. While international judicial bodies have found that
international human rights law continues to apply in times of armed
conflict, some states consistently reject this position and instead argue that
international human rights law ceases to apply or is otherwise entirely
abrogated by the application of the lex specialis of thejus in bello.16 1
158. Id.
159. See supra note 153.
160. See e.g., ICCPR, art. 28.
161. See J. Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection ofHuman Rights Law & the Law
ofNon-International Armed Conflict in a Transnational Context, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW, 399 (2007);
see also Second and Third Periodic Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee on
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Despite this continuing controversy over the application of human
rights law to international armed conflict, there now appears to be
consensus that human rights law does apply in internal armed conflicts.' 62
Even the United States, which has been vocal in its rejection of the
application of human rights treaties to international armed conflicts and to
transnational, non-international armed conflicts, has never objected to the
application of human rights law to internal armed conflicts. 6 1 Indeed, the
United States consistently exerts pressure bilaterally on states dealing with
situations of internal armed conflict to comply with their obligations under
international human rights law.'6
Thus, to the extent the conflict in Libya remained internal, the
application of international human rights law to it was uncontroversial.
This does not mean, however, that there is not a continuing controversy
over the inter-operability of particular rules of human rights law and
humanitarian law in this context. There are still divergent views on this
subject.
As noted above, once other states began to use armed force against
Libya, the law of international armed conflict began to apply to the conflict
between those states and Libya. The applicability of international human
rights law to international armed conflicts remains unsettled, though a
consensus appears to be emerging in favor of application at least where the
relevant party to the conflict is exercising a degree of control over territory
or individuals.165 In any event, if the role of the intervening states is limited
to aerial bombing campaigns (i.e. in the absence of any direct control of
individuals or territory), then most questions arising under international
human rights law, even if applicable, would likely be resolved by reference
to the rules of the jus in bello as lex specialis.
Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, October 21, 2005,
at para. 130.
162. Id.
163. It may be that this position simply reduces to rejection of extraterritorial application of
human rights treaties, though the United States maintains that that is a separate and independent ground
for non-application of human rights treaties.
164. See e.g., the many reports of the US State Department applying international human rights
law to situations of armed conflict, such as the 2003 report on Colombia. Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 25, 2004, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27891.htm.
165. See Jurisdiction and Power, supra, note 162 at 446.
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C. Use of Force Issues
A number of controversial legal issues are implicated by the Security
Council's authorization to use force in this context.
Some have suggested that the Security Council's authorization to use
force to protect civilians was a manifestation of the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine. To the extent this assessment is accurate, it underscores
the political nature of the doctrine. The use of force was authorized by a
vote of the Security Council-a vote that was enabled through a careful
alignment of political factors, including Gaddafi's lack of allies in the Arab
world. There is little indication that the response by the international
community gave legal content to the Responsibility to Protect concept,
except perhaps as a conceptual umbrella for independently existing
obligations under human rights and humanitarian law.'"
More controversial has been the way in which force was used by the
intervening states and regional organizations. In particular, the
international community's support for the mandate began to erode in the
wake of concerns that NATO was exceeding the authorization granted by
the Security Council in Resolution 1973.
The Security Council's grant of authority to use force to "protect
civilians and civilian populated areas" seemed to sweep more broadly than
the more limited establishment of "safe areas" called for by the Arab
League. 6 7 Presumably, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States
preferred not to have to go back to the Security Council again if an initial
grant of authority proved inadequate. Nonetheless, the Security Council
imposed limits on the authorization to use force, clearly envisioning a
protective use of force.'6 8  Thus, despite the breadth of the mandate, it
would not seem to encompass regime change. 6 9
166. While Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 both refer to the "responsibility to
protect," this phrase is used to refer to Libya's responsibility to protect its own population. This
obligation clearly exists under the very broad spectrum of obligations under human rights and
humanitarian law applicable to Libya.
167. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Protection of
Civilians and Civilian-Populated Areas, 1 (June 2011), available at http://www.nato.int/natostatic/
assets/pdflpdf_2011_06/20110608_Factsheet-UPProtectionCivilians.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012)
[hereinafter NATO Fact Sheet].
168. See generally id.
169. See generally Memorandum Opinion for Attorney General, Authority to Use Military
Force in Libya, OPS. OF THE OFF. OF LEGAL COUNS. VOL. 35 (Apr. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). In a
footnote, the memo states, "Although President Obama has expressed opposition to Qadhafi's continued
leadership of Libya, we understand that regime change is not an objective of the coalition's military
operations." It then quotes President Obama's March 28, 2011 public address: "Of course, there is no
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Key to assessing the scope of the mandate is the interpretation of the
term "civilian.,,17 0  To interpret this term in light of existing rules of
international law,'71 one would naturally turn to the law of armed conflict.
As the mandate was formulated against the backdrop of the internal armed
conflict in Libya, the relevant body of law would be the law of non-
international armed conflict.
There are divergent opinions as to the meaning of the term "civilian"
in non-international armed conflict. Some authorities take the position that
as civilians are traditionally defined as those who are not combatants, and
as there are, strictly speaking, no combatants in non-international armed
conflict, then all individuals in a non-international armed conflict are
civilians.17 2 This would arguably even include Gaddafi himself, as well as
the members of his security forces. On this interpretation, only purely
defensive uses of force would be permissible, as any offensive use of force
would necessarily target those who are to be protected.
Others reject such a broad application of the term civilian, contending
that those who take part in the hostilities are effectively combatants, styling
them as unlawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents.'7 3  This would
include Gaddafi's security forces, rebel soldiers, and depending upon the
breadth of interpretation, any other individual taking part in the hostilities.
On this interpretation, protection of these individuals would fall outside the
mandate. Noteworthy in this context is that the United States government
over the past decade has advanced a relatively narrow conception of
civilian status, excluding those taking part in the hostilities, or even
providing material support to the belligerents. In the present context, such
interpretations narrow its authority to use force.
A further wrinkle is introduced by use of the term "civilian populated
areas under threat of attack." 7 4  Use of this phrase could expand the
mandate to include protection of all places where civilians reside. In
particular, it could be read to include within the mandate the use of force to
protect all parts of Libya. Of course it would also then apply to towns
where Gaddafi loyalists resided.
question that Libya-and the world-would be better off with Qaddafi out of power. I . .. will actively
pursue [that goal] through non-military means. But broadening our military mission to include regime
change would be a mistake."
170. NATO Fact Sheet, supra note 227, 11.
171. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
172. See ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
Under International Humanitarian Law, May 2009, at 27.
173. Id.
174. NATO Fact Sheet, supra note 227, 1.
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Once the tide turned against Gaddafi and the rebels began to launch
offensives against loyalist strongholds, the legality of continued NATO
bombing in support of the rebels is questionable. Particularly difficult to
justify under the mandate would be the continuing NATO attacks after the
Gaddafi regime was in full retreat. 7 5  While some have reasoned that
protection of civilians in Libya necessitated regime change, and that
dislodging Gaddafi from power was a justified means of fulfilling the
mandate, such reasoning renders the limitations expressly set forth in
Resolution 1973 almost meaningless.
If NATO's use of force exceeded the scope of the 1973 authorization,
would that then constitute the crime of aggression within the definition for
that crime adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the ICC? The
aggression amendment adopted at the Review Conference defines
aggression as the
[P]lanning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 76
The phrase "act of aggression" is then defined by reference to U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 3314.' That resolution does not expressly
refer to uses of force in excess of Security Council authorization.17 8
Nonetheless, it does provide an analogous category of conduct.17 9  It
includes as an act of aggression "[tihe use of armed forces of one State
which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the
receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the
termination of the agreement." 80  Thus, to the extent the definition of
aggression includes ultra vires uses of force, it could be argued that certain
175. Libya conflict: Nato jets hit Gaddaft Sirte bunker, BBC NEWS, August 26, 2011; Libya's
NTC troops renew assault on pro-Gaddaf Sirte, BBC NEWS, September 25, 2011; NATO: It didn't
know Gadhaff was in bombed convoy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, October 21, 2011.
176. Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of
Aggression, R.C. Res. 13/4, 13th Sess., Annex I, art. 8, 1, at 2 (June 11, 2010).
177. G.A. Res. 29/3314 (XXIX), at 142-143, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 29/3314, Definition of Aggression].
178. See generally id.
179. Id.
180. G.A. Res. 29/3314, Definition of Aggression, supra note 251, Annex art. 3(e).
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offensive aspects of the NATO bombing campaign qualify as acts of
aggression.' 8'
The definition of the crime of aggression, however, is somewhat
narrower. In particular, the act of aggression would have to "by its
character, gravity and scale, constitute[] a manifest violation of the Charter
of the United Nations."'8 Given the divergent interpretations of the
mandate, it would be difficult to conclude that any violation was
"manifest," or objectively evident.'83
In any event, NATO's broad interpretation of the mandate seems to
have set back the Responsibility to Protect doctrine as a political matter. 84
Russia and China, states that have traditionally advocated robust
interpretations of the non-intervention principle but were persuaded to
acquiesce in the 1973 mandate, have since voted against even the mildest
measures in relation to the situation in Syria.'
D. ICC Referral Issues
The ICC referral also raises a number of significant legal issues,
including the applicability of Head of State immunity and the principle of
non-retroactive application of criminal law (or nullem crimen sine lege).86
The Security Council referral was a necessary pre-condition to the
exercise of ICC jurisdiction in this case, because Libya is not a party to the
ICC Statute.' Libya's non-party status is also relevant to the issues of
Head of State immunity and the application of nullem crimen.
18 1. Id.
182. See generally Definition of Aggression, supra note 251.
183. Vienna Convention, supra note 231, art. 46(2).
184. See Article 46(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for an indication of the
meaning of the term "manifest." Vienna Convention, supra note 231, art. 46(2).
185. Neil MacFarquhar, UN. Resolution on Syria Blocked by Russia and China, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/middleeast/russia-
and-china-block-united-nations-resolution-on-syria.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 5,
2012).
186. Russia and China voted against the resolutions at both of the Human Rights Council's
Special Sessions on Syria. They also vetoed a draft Security Council resolution that merely suggested
the possibility of future sanctions.
187. ICC Statute, supra note 71, art. 12, 1 3. The Court may also exercise jurisdiction over a
case if it has the consent of the state of nationality of the alleged perpetrator or of the territory in which
the crime occurred, even if these states are not parties to the Rome Statute. As the crimes concerned
were allegedly perpetrated by Libyans on Libyan territory, and as the consent of the Libyan government
was not forthcoming at the relevant time, Security Council referral was only the means by which the
Court could exercise its jurisdiction.
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As noted above, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued an arrest warrant for
Gaddafi in June 2011.188 As an incumbent Head of State, Gaddafi was
entitled to absolute immunity from foreign legal process under customary
international law. Although Gaddafi's death has rendered the issue moot,
the question remains whether the issuance of the arrest warrant was a
violation of international law, and if so, which entity, if any, bore
responsibility for the violation.
The ICC has satisfied for itself the lawfulness of issuing arrest
warrants for sitting Heads of State by reference to its own Statute. The
Statute provides that "[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction
over such a person."' 89 Thus, those states that are parties to the treaty have
effectively waived immunity claims. This is not true for states that are not
parties to the treaty. 190 Nonetheless, in its decision authorizing the issuance
of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir, an ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber found that the abrogation of immunity provided in the ICC
Statute applied equally vis-a-vis the territorial states of situations referred to
the Court by the Security Council irrespective of whether or not that state is
a party to the ICC Statute.'91 It remains unresolved whether this decision is
consistent with customary international law.
It may be argued that Security Council Resolution 1970, in deciding
that "the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully" with the Court,
effectively abrogated any immunities.192 However, it is also arguable that
any derogation of existing customary international law would have to be
expressly stipulated.
In any event, even if the issuance of the arrest warrant conflicted with
international law, it is unclear who would bear responsibility for the
violation. Is the ICC a legal person bound by customary international law?
Even if it is a legal person, and even if it violated customary international
law, it remains unclear what remedy would be available to injured states or
individuals.
Another issue related to Libya's status as a non-State Party to the
Rome Statute revolves around the principle nullem crimen sine lege.
188. ICC Issues Warrants, supra note 146.
189. ICC Statute, supra note 71, art. 27, 12.
190. Vienna Convention, supra note 231, art. 34.
191. See generally Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4,
2009).
192. Resolution 1970, supra note 57.
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According to this principle, an individual may not be prosecuted for
conduct that was not proscribed by applicable law at the time the conduct
took place.'93 As Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute, the criminal
prohibitions set forth therein did not form part of the law applicable to
Libyan nationals acting on the territory of Libya. Nonetheless, many of
those prohibitions were applicable as customary international law.
At the time the Rome Statute was adopted, there was broad agreement
that most of the crimes included in the Court's subject matter jurisdiction
had already acquired the status of customary law.19 4 It was also understood,
however, that there was an element of progressive development in the
Statute, particularly in relation to the war crimes provisions applicable in
situations of non-international armed conflict.'95
Hardly a decade earlier, it was far from clear whether even the most
serious violations of the law of non-international armed conflict would give
rise to the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator in
international law. By the mid-1990s, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia had determined that serious violations of
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were war crimes
giving rise to individual criminal responsibility.196  The Tribunal's
pronouncements were not met with any significant opposition from states.
By the time of the Rome Statute's adoption in the summer of 1998, it was
already well accepted among states that serious violations of Common
Article 3 constituted war crimes. The Rome Statute, however, provides a
much more extensive elaboration of war crimes in non-intemational armed
conflict, going well beyond the provisions of Common Article 3. Thus, in
considering war crimes charges against the suspects, the Court will have to
carefully examine whether the crimes were well-established in customary
international law in early 2011.197
193. ICC Statute, supra note 71, art. 22, T 1. The ICC Statute incorporates a variation of this
principle in its Article 22, which states "A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute
unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court."
194. See supra note 18.
195. It was for this reason that Article 124 of the Statute was included as a transitional measure.
196. ICTY, Tadic Appeal Decision, 2 October 1995, paragraph 129.
197. Crimes Against Humanity charges are less controversial. Crimes Against Humanity have
been established rules of customary international law at least since 1946, when the Nuremberg
principles were unanimously affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly. See G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N.
GAOR, Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946). In addition, the ICC Statute sets a
higher bar from crimes against humanity than customary international law, at least as formulated by the
ad hoc Tribunals. The ICC Statute requires as a contextual element for Crimes Against Humanity that
the attack be "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack."
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IV. CONCLUSION
In responding to the situation in Libya, the international community
employed virtually every legal tool at its disposal. In so doing, it
demonstrated the expanding reach of international law and institutions with
respect to materially internal situations, and reflected the growing political
will that has enabled this expansion. However, as the contrasting response
to the situation in Syria demonstrates, the selection of tools, and indeed
whether to respond at all, remains a political choice.
The combination of these tools in the Libyan context also reveals the
extent to which a number of important legal issues of human rights law, the
jus in bello, the jus ad bellum, and international criminal law are
unresolved. At the same time, the political, ad hoc nature of the
international community's response to the situation in Libya portends that
many of these issues will likely remain unresolved for the foreseeable
future.
ICC Statute, supra note 71, art. 7(2)(a). The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has held that there is no such policy requirement under
customary law. As the Rome Statute definition sets a higher bar than customary law, thus capturing a
narrower category of conduct, the nullem crimen principle is not offended, at least with respect to these
contextual elements.
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